Corporate governance and the financial performance of commercial banks in Ghana by Gyamerah, Samuel et al.
Journal of Research in Emerging Markets 
ISSN: 2663-905X  
Journal of Research in Emerging Markets, 2020, 2(4); DOI: 10.30585/jrems.v2i4.541 https://publications.ud.ac.ae/index.php/jrems 
Article 
Corporate governance and the financial performance 
of commercial banks in Ghana 
Samuel Gyamerah 1, *Hannah Fosuaa Amo 2, Sandra Adomako 3 
 
1 University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, No.2006, Xiyuan Ave, West Hi-Tech Zone, 
611731, Chengdu, Sichuan, P.R. China; gyamerahsda@gmail.com 
2  Valley View University, Box AF. 595, Oyibi, Accra, Ghana; hamo@vvu.edu.gh  
3  University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, No.2006, Xiyuan Ave, West Hi-Tech Zone, 
611731,Chengdu, Sichuan, P.R. China; sandraadmoko@gmail.com  
* Correspondence: hamo@vvu.edu.gh 
Received: 23 June 2020; Accepted: 30 August 2020; Published: 12 September 2020 
Abstract: This study aims to provide further evidence on the effect of corporate governance on the 
performance of Ghanaian banks. Two performance measures were used in this study, namely: Return 
on Asset (ROA) and Cost-Income Ratio (CIR). Data for the analysis were sourced from 21 commercial 
banks from 2005 to 2015. Regression estimation techniques were employed for analysis purposes. The 
result revealed that large board size reduces banks’ performance. Furthermore, CEO duality and 
foreign ownership negatively affect the performance of banks. However, while the effect of CEO 
duality was significant on CIR, it was not significant in the case of ROA. On the contrary, the effect 
of foreign ownership was only significant on ROA. Moreover, board independence has a significant 
positive effect on both CIR and ROA, while audit committee independence has no significant effect 
on CIR and ROA. The paper argues that for a good corporate governance practice, banks should 
institute a small board with more than half of the members being independent directors. 
Furthermore, the role of the board chair should be separated from that of the managing director/CEO. 
The study provides insight and further evidence to stakeholders and regulators to deal with the crisis 
in the Ghanaian banking sector. 
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1. Introduction 
In today’s dynamic economy, especially considering the dynamism of the Ghanaian banking, the 
importance of corporate governance cannot be over-emphasized. Many factors could influence the 
performance of banks, but the relevance of corporate governance in banks is necessary because it 
underpins the organizational climate for the core activities of the bank, and it is a key determinant for 
the profitability and efficiency of firms (Nyarko, Yusheng & Zhu, 2017). Corporate governance is how 
an organization is directed and controlled (Cadbury Report, 1999). The concept of corporate 
governance gained root following the financial scandals and sudden collapse of large firms like Enron, 
WorldCom, Xerox, and others in the early 2000s (Berndt & Leibfried, 2007). Notwithstanding, the 
financial crises in the middle of 2007, leading to bank insolvency, loss on the global stock exchange, 
and decline in the economy, corporate governance has gained more popularity in the banking sector. 
To alleviate corporate scandals and fraud in organizations, scholars and business practitioners have 
promoted corporate governance in firms (Adusei, 2011; Al-Hawary, 2011; Nyarko et al., 2017; Zhou, 
Owusu-Ansah, & Maggina, 2018;).  
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A plethora of studies on corporate governance has found evidence that corporate governance 
enhances firm performance (Abor & Adjasi, 2007; Adusei, 2011; Chung et al., 2003; Frimpong et al. 
2015; Hu & Izumida, 2008; Nyarko et al., 2017; Sarpong et al., 2013). However, a few studies have 
debunked the general idea of corporate governance, enhancing firm performance by reporting a 
negative relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Bathala & Rao, 1995; 
Hutchinson, 2002). Other research by Park and Shin (2003), Prevost et al. (2002) and Young (2003) have 
reported no relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
Though the majority of studies exist on the relationship between corporate governance and the 
financial performance of firms, little has been done in the banking sector of Ghana. Meanwhile, studies 
focusing on the banking sector have reported mixed results. For example, Nyarko et al. (2017) reported 
that large board size, long-serving CEOs, size of the audit committee, audit committee independence, 
foreign ownership, institutional ownership, annual general meeting, and dividend policy is positively 
associated with the financial performance of banks in Ghana. Adusei (2011) reported a positive 
association with board independence and the bank's efficiency. Aboagye, Agyemang, and Ahali (2013) 
in a similar study reported mixed results between governance variables and the bank's performance.   
Recent developments in Ghana’s banking sector has raised alarming concern for the quality of 
corporate governance practice in the industry. In the middle of 2017, the Bank of Ghana collapsed two 
giant banks in Ghana. Notwithstanding, in early August of 2018, the Bank of Ghana revoked the license 
of five banks and consolidated then into ‘The Consolidated Bank’. These were both unlisted and listed 
banks on the Ghana Stock Exchange.  The Bank of Ghana accused the collapsed firms of a range of 
issues, including poor corporate governance, questionable transactions, and dishonest reporting (Bank 
of Ghana, 2018). These events have created doubts among investors and corporate players concerning 
the governance of banks and other financial institutions in Ghana. Despite the numerous studies on 
corporate governance in Ghana, current development in the banking industry is absurd, suggesting 
that further evidence is required to elucidate this situation.  This study is, therefore, focused in this 
direction by providing additional evidence on this corporate governance dilemma, and to provide 
evidence that could explain the recent tumult in the Ghanaian banking sector.  
While prior research has enhanced our understanding of the relationship between corporate 
governance and the performance of banks in Ghana, several gaps remain unexplored. One generally 
unexplored area is the simultaneous evaluation of listed and unlisted banks. The majority of the 
literature has assessed either corporate governance in association with the performance of unlisted 
banks or listed banks, with most of the studies focusing on the later except for Adusei, (2011) and 
Nyako et al., (2017). Prior literature in Ghana has used historical accounting performance measures 
like return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and Cost-Income Ratio (CIR) to measure the 
performance of banks (Nyarko et al., 2017, Frimpong et al., 2015, Adusei, 2011).  However, few studies 
like Adeabah, Gyeke-Dako, and Andoh (2018) and Frimpong et al. (2015) have focused on examining 
the effect of corporate governance on the efficiency of banks. This study, therefore, adds to the 
literature by providing further evidence on how corporate governance affects both the efficiency and 
financial performance of banks by utilizing ROA (financial performance) and CIR (efficiency) as the 
primary performance variables. Moreover, the study provides a parsimonious explanation for why 
corporate governance practices do not only affect the financial performance of banks but also the 
efficiency of the banks. Notwithstanding, this study is timely as it could provide evidence on the 
reason for the recent turbulence in the Ghanaian banking sector.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the corporate governance codes and 
regulation of banks in Ghana. Section 3 reviews prior literature as a basis for developing the testable 
hypothesis. Section 4 presents the research methodology, the variables, and how the variables were 
measured. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results, and the last part concludes with a 
discussion on practical implications and limitations 
2. Background of Banking and Governance in Ghana 
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The Ghanaian banking sector has experienced substantial phases of financial deregulations to 
make the industry very competitive. Banking activities in Ghana commenced in 1896 with the 
establishment of the British Bank of West Africa, now Standard Chartered Bank Limited, to provide 
lending and borrowing of money (Buckle, 1999). Although Barclays Bank Ghana Limited was set up 
in 1917 to dispense banking activities in Ghana, the banking industry was still manipulated by foreign 
hands because Ghana was bogged down in the quagmire of colonialism (Akomea-Frimpong, 2017).  
After Ghana gained political independence from the British in 1957, the central bank (Bank of 
Ghana) was established. The central banks implemented some interventional policies and regulations 
for prudent control of the cost and direction of finances to enhance economic development. The 
establishment of public sector banks, imposition of administrative controls on interest rates, and 
sectoral allocation of bank credits were notable among these policies. Ghana witness expedient 
expansion in the banking sector after these policies were implemented after independence (Akomea-
Frimpong, 2017).  
However, the banking sector was plagued with financial crisis from 1983 to 1988. The industry 
was characterized by financial repression, negative interest rate, and massive public sector borrowing, 
which are often unproductive (Brownbridge & Gockel, 1998). This crisis resulted in a landmark reform 
program by the Bank of Ghana, with assistance from the World Bank and IMF is known as the 
Financial Sector Structural Adjustment Program (FINSAP) to address this problem. The FINSAP 
resulted in the resuscitating of the financial sector and the creation of new institutions such as the 
Ghana Stock Exchange and Non-Banking Financial Institutions to revive the financial industry.  
These reforms were successful, albeit some difficulties. In 1989 a New Banking Act was 
introduced to parallel these reforms. This Act spelled out the capital requirements for local and foreign 
banks and gave supervisory and legal powers to the Bank of Ghana. These reforms stabilized and 
stimulated the banking sector. For example, the number of commercial banks increased from 14 in 
1994 to 24 commercial banks in 2012 (Ghana Banking Survey, 2012). Other several regulations, acts, 
and developments have taken place in the banking industry. Over the years, the Banks of Ghana has 
increased the minimum capital requirements of banks to strengthen further the safety, soundness, and 
stability of the banking system. For example, in 2008 the minimum capital was GHC 60 million ($ 30 
million), GHC 120 million ($ 60 million) in 2017, and currently GHC 400 million by the end of 2018 
which the bank of Ghana has estimated that only 19 universal banks could meet this minimum capital 
requirement (Bank of Ghana, 2018). 
These regulations and the supervisory role of the Bank of Ghana has increased the assets base of 
the banking industry and has placed the nation in a situation where it can capitalize on modern 
banking technology. The rise in the number of banks and competition among banks has resulted in the 
banks spending vast sums of money on innovative marketing, developing new products and state of 
the art technology to keep abreast with time and remain competitive ((Akomea-Frimpong, 2017).  
In Ghana, there are several mechanisms implemented to boost the practice of corporate 
governance. The regulatory framework for an effective corporate governance practice enshrined in the 
Companies code 1963 (Act 179), the Security Industry Law, The Ghana Stock Exchange Regulations 
1990, (Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 1509), the Securities and Exchange Regulations (2003), L.I. 1728, and 
the Stock Exchange Commission guidelines on best practices in corporate governance (issued and 
published in 2003). According to Sarpong et al., (2013), these frameworks aid in the regulation of the 
financial sector and other business sectors as well.  
According to the Stock Exchange Commission guidelines on best practices in corporate 
governance (issued and published in 2003), the regulatory framework for effective corporate 
governance in Ghana has been divided into six sections, namely: 
1. The mission, responsibilities, and accountability of the board;  
2. Committees of the board;  
3. Relationship to shareholders and stakeholders, and the rights of shareholders;  
4. Financial affairs and auditing;  
5. Disclosures in annual reports; and  
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6. Code of ethics. 
The World Bank assessed Ghana's legal and regulatory framework regarding the observance of 
standards and codes. The initiative which was to identify weaknesses that may contribute to the 
financial vulnerability of the country benchmarks the country's legal and regulatory framework of 
listed firms regarding the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
principles. The report revealed that Ghana lags in some key areas compared to some other countries 
in the sub-region. Apart from the numerous regulations and laws governing the operation of 
companies in Ghana, the Ghana Stock Exchange in 2010, developed and implemented Ghana's code of 
best practices of Corporate Governance (2010) to regulate all listed firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange.  
Due to the recent collapse and merger of some giant banks in Ghana in 2017 and 2018, the concept 
of corporate governance of banks has become crucial in the banking sector of Ghana. Although there 
are numerous regulations governing banking activities in Ghana, the continuous shrinking of banks 
has become quite worrisome. Also, despite the evidence provided by the numerous studies in Ghana 
on corporate governance and performance of firms, banks are still saddled with poor corporate 
governance. This suggests that further evidence is needed on corporate governance and performance 
in the banking sector.  
3. Literature and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Empirical Literature  
Adeabah et al. (2018) investigated the efficiency of 21 listed and non-listed Ghanaian banks under 
board gender diversity, and also examined the determinants of bank efficiency. The study concluded 
that gender diversity promotes bank efficiency to a certain threshold, and board size improves bank 
efficiency while influential chief executives do the opposite. They mentioned ownership structure, 
bank size, bank age, and loan-to-deposit ratio as factors affecting bank efficiency. Notwithstanding, 
Nyarko et al. (2017) in their study on corporate governance and performance of firms in the banking 
sector of Ghana, argue that board size, long-serving CEOs, size of the audit committee, audit 
committee independence, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, annual general meeting, and 
dividend policy are positively related and associated with the financial performance of banks in 
Ghana. Frimpong et al. (2015) examined the impact corporate governance has on the performance of 
listed Ghanaian banks. The study revealed a significant positive relationship between ROA and non-
executive directors, bank size, and bank growth. In contrast, audit committee size, board gender 
diversity, board business management, board member education recorded a significant negative 
association with ROA. 
The study of Fidanoski, Mateska, and Simeonovski (2013) investigated corporate governance and 
the performance of banks in Macedonia and found that board independence is negatively associated 
with banks' performance while the size of both supervisory and the managing board is positively 
associated with profitability. The study also showed that the proportion of non-executive members is 
positively associated with profitability. Similarly, Adusei (2011) examined the relationship between 
board structure and Bank performance in Ghana. The study using data from 17 commercial banks in 
Ghana revealed that banks' profitability increases with the size of the board. Again, they uncovered 
that board independence is positively related to bank efficiency but negatively related to profitability.  
Bokpin (2010) examined ownership structure, corporate governance, and bank efficiency in 
Ghana. The study result showed that foreign banks are more cost-efficient than domestic banks and 
enjoy better quality loans. The cost-efficiency of banks is as a result of managerial leadership. The 
study revealed that a larger board size strongly improves profit but slightly worsens banks' cost-
efficiency. Papanikolaou and Patsi (2009) studied corporate governance and performance of some 
banks in Europe, Canada, America, Australia, and Japna. The study revealed a negligible negative 
relationship between bank performance and corporate governance. Although the study found a 
positive correlation between inside shareholders and bank performance, it concluded that there is no 
reliable evidence that corporate governance affects bank performance.  Again, Love and Rachinsky 
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(2008) investigated the relationship between ownership, corporate governance, and operating 
performance of Russian and Ukrainian banks. The study revealed some significant but economically 
unimportant relationship between corporate governance and operating performance. 
Again, Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) examined the impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance in Africa by drawing dynamic data from Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya. The 
study revealed that a large and independent board enhances firms' value and that CEO duality hurts 
firm performance.  The result also portrayed that the CEO's tenure of office and the size of the audit 
committee together with their intensity of meeting have a positive effect on performance. On the 
contrary, board activity intensity affects profitability negatively.  Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 
(2006a) investigated the effect boards, and CEOs have on the performance of banks in Ghana using 
ROA and changes in interest income as a performance measure. The study concluded that a more 
independent board harms profitability.  Whiles their result showed a positive relationship between 
board size and ROA, CEO tenure of office mostly impacts profitability negatively. Although their 
study primarily indicated mixed results, the study suggested that banks should operate with moderate 
board size and adopt a two-tier board structure.  
The above literature postulates that many researchers have widely investigated the concept of 
corporate governance and the performance of banks. The majority of these studies have been carried 
out in most advanced markets and economies as well as developing countries. However, the current 
literature on corporate governance and banks’ performance in Ghana is scanty. Furthermore, the 
majority of the studies have focused on samples drawn from either listed firms or non-listed firms 
without considering a comprehensive data set. Moreover, the majority of studies have employed 
financial and market performance variables, while a few studies have explored efficiency performance 
measures.  Considering the recent developments in the banking sector of Ghana, banks’ operating 
efficiency has become a crucial question. This study utilizes a large sample constituting both listed and 
non-listed banks to provide further evidence on the effect of corporate governance on the efficiency 
and financial performance of Ghanaian banks.  
3.2 Hypothesis Development  
3.2.1 Board Size  
There have been mixed results as to the influence board size has on the performance of firms. 
According to Lawal (2012), the quality of board deliberations and the ability of the board to achieve 
the best possible corporate decisions are influenced by board size. The study of Kyereboah-Coleman 
and Biekpe (2006b) and Nyarko et al. (2011) opined that large board size has a positive association with 
the performance of Ghanaian firms because the board will exhibit more exceptional intellectual ability 
which will lead to improve decision-making and enhance firm performance. However, the study of 
Adusei (2011) argued that small board size increase profitability since the benefits of higher intellectual 
ability might be swallowed by the incremental cost of inadequate communication associated with large 
groups. This position has been articulated by researchers like Frimpong et al. (2015) who supported 
small board size. Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) concurred with this assertion by voicing 
that large board size is less productive and can be controlled easily by a powerful CEO. According to 
The Bank of Ghana (2018), a bank's board should constitute a minimum of five members and a 
maximum of 13 members. In this study, large board size is defined as a board with more than eight 
members. It is expected that a large board size should have a positive relationship with the 
performance of banks. Therefore, the study formulates the hypothesis below: 
H1: ceteris paribus, a large board size has a significant positive effect on the performance of Ghanaian banks. 
3.2.2 CEO Duality 
This mechanism indicates how the firm separates the role of the CEO from that of the chairman. 
The agency theory argues that the role of the CEO must be separated from that of the chairman to 
protect the right of shareholders. Nyarko et al., (2017), have argued that separating the role of the CEO 
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and the chairman can improve the quality of board monitoring, leading to better decision-making and 
performance as well. A combined role may result in conflicting perspectives which will hinder the 
monitoring power and effectiveness of the board. Prior studies on this subject have reported a positive 
relationship between the separation of the role of the CEO from chairman and performance. For 
example, the study of Wahab, Haron, Lock, and Yahya (2015) reported a significant positive 
relationship between the separation of CEO and chairman and performance after examining corporate 
governance mechanisms in Malaysia firms. Again, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006b) reported 
a negative relationship between performance and a one-tier board where one person performs a dual 
role as CEO and chairman of listed firms in Ghana. The study explained that the concentration of 
decision management and decision control in one person reduces the effectiveness of the board 
monitoring powers on top management. The Bank of Ghana in 2017 issued new regulations on CEO 
duality, stating that the positions of Managing Director and Board Chair cannot be occupied 
concurrently in the case of foreign banks in Ghana.  Other studies by Abdullah (2004); Van den Berghe 
and Levrau, (2004) have also reported similar results. However, Finegold, Benson, and Hecht (2007) 
document mixed results regarding how the separation of CEO from chairman affects performance. 
However, existing literature has shown that separation of the role of CEO from chairman serves as a 
useful mechanism for improving the performance of firms. Therefore, leading to the second 
hypothesis: 
H2: ceteris paribus, CEO duality has a significant positive effect on the performance of Ghanaian banks. 
3.2.3 Audit Committee Independence  
The audit committee is an essential corporate governance mechanism as it protects the interest of 
shareholders and oversees financial reporting. Existing studies have argued that an independent audit 
committee has a positive effect on the performance of firms. For instance, Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) 
reported a positive association between an independent audit committee and the performance of 
Ghanaian firms. This is supported by the study of Hamdan, Sarea, and Reyad (2013) who reported a 
significant positive relationship between Tobin's q and audit committee independence. Triki and 
Bouaziz (2012) expounded that the crucial role of the audit committee is to protect shareholders' 
interest. It is evident that an independent audit committee enhances firm performance since the Bank 
of Ghana accused the collapsed firms of a range of issues including questionable transactions and 
dishonest reporting-which is the job of the audit committee (Bank of Ghana, 2018).   
Although some studies like that of Kajola (2008) showed no evidence of an association between 
firm performance and audit committee independence in non-financial institutions, this study 
considers audit committee independence as an essential mechanism in the governance of firms. The 
study asserts that their presence improves performance. To test this argument, the following 
hypothesis is put forward: 
H3: ceteris paribus, Audit Committee Independence has a positive effect on the performance of Ghanaian 
banks. 
3.2.4 Board Independence  
In the banking literature, the majority of studies have documented the positive effect board 
independence has on bank's performance.  For example, the study of Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 
(2006a) found a significant positive relationship between the majority of non-executive directors and 
the performance of Ghanaian banks. The results concurred with a more recent study by Nyarko et al., 
(2017) who found a positive relationship between board independence and banks' performance in 
Ghana. The study argued that an independent board enhances monitoring effectively and promotes 
firm value maximization. Likewise, other studies such as Baker and Gary (2015) Mashayekhi and 
Bazaz (2008), and Uadiale (2010) reported a significant positive relationship between board 
independence and firm performance. Few studies, like Kajola (2008) showed a negative relationship 
between board composition and performance.  
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In Ghana, banks are required to have a maximum of a thirteen-member board, the majority of 
which must be non-executives and ordinary residents of Ghana (Bank of Ghana, 2018). Therefore, a 
board that has more than 50% of non-executive directors is considered to be independent in this study. 
This study argued that board independence is critical for more excellent monitoring, transparency, 
and improved performance in the case of the Ghanaian banking sector, where many banks have 
collapsed or experienced principal shrinks in operations. Thus, it is expected that board independence 
should have a performance-enhancing effect on banks in Ghana.  The hypothesis that was used to test 
the argument put forward is: 
H4: Ceteris paribus board independence has a significant positive effect on the performance of Ghanaian 
banks.  
3.2.5 Foreign ownership 
Foreign ownership in this study refers to banks owned and managed by foreign investors. 
According to Nyarko et al. (2017), foreign ownership enhances the performance of banks in Ghana. 
The study argued that foreign owners are more concerned about how their resources are managed and 
therefore ensure effective monitoring of management to prevent managerial exploitation. Stulz (1999) 
posited that the presence of foreign investors reduces agency costs. The study expounded that these 
investors may be from countries where corporate governance has gained its stance and would ensure 
that the same practices are adhered to by the firms they invest in. Therefore, it is expected that foreign 
ownership should enhance the performance of banks in Ghana. This leads to the fifth hypothesis:  
H5: ceteris paribus, foreign ownership has a significant positive effect on the performance of Ghanaian banks 
4. Data and Methods 
4.1 Sample and Data collection  
The population of the study includes all commercial banks in Ghana. Currently, there are 31 banks 
in Ghana, with eight listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). Data was collected from 21 of these 
banks. These banks were selected based on the availability of data for the period under study. The data 
collected were panel data pooled from the financial reports of the financial institutions from 2005 to 
2015.  
Table 1. Sample Selection.  
Sample Selection Observations 
Total number of licensed banks in Ghana as of August 2015 31 
Banks listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange  8 
Unlisted banks in Ghana 23 
Number of listed banks included in the sample for the period under study  8 
Number of unlisted banks included in the sample (note: 10 banks were excluded 
due to unavailability of some data for the period under study) 
13 
Total banks sampled from 2005 to 2015.  21 
4.2 Method of Data Analysis   
The study employed ordinary least squares (OLS) based on a panel data regression analysis since 
the data consist of observation of multiple variables over multiple periods.  
The general form of the model is given as: 
    yit = 𝛼i + βXit + 𝛆it                                                                 
i = Cross-sectional dimension 
t = time series dimension  
y = dependent variable 
βX = set of independent variables in the model 
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𝛼 = the constant 
 
Therefore, the empirical model for the study is established as below: 
PERFORMit = ᵹ0 + ᵹ 1(BDSIZE)it + ᵹ 2 (DUALITY)it + ᵹ 3(AUDITIND) it + ᵹ 4 (BDIND)it +  
                       δ5(FOROWN)it + δ6(FMSIZE)it+ δ7(LISTING) it +  δ8(BIG-4)it +𝛆it          (1) 
• PERFORM =Performance is measured by two indicators: CIR (as a measure of bank efficiency) 
and ROA (as a measure of financial performance). The ROA is measured by net income divided 
by total assets, while CIR is non-interest costs as a proportion of net income.   
• BDSIZE = Size of the board of directors;  
• DUALITY = Refers to the situation where the position of the board chair is concurrently occupied 
by the managing director/CEO.  
• AUDITIND = The ratio of non-executive directors on an audit committee to the total number of 
directors on the audit committee of a bank;  
• BDIND =The ratio of the number of independent members on a board of directors to the total 
number of directors of a bank;  
• FOROWN = The proportion of foreign ownership  
• FMSIZE = Firm size measured by the log of total assets;  
• LISTING = Listing status of a bank coded one if it is listed on Ghana Stock Exchange and zero 
otherwise. 
• BIG-4= Dummy variable: code 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm and 0 if otherwise. 
 
Literature has revealed that most studies on corporate governance suffer from the problem of 
endogeneity which could influence the interpretation of the results. For example, audit committee 
independence and firm performance could be endogenously determined. Therefore, following Zhou 
et al. (2018), the study employs a 2SLS model to estimate an equation system to address this 
endogeneity problem.  Furthermore, to take into account the serial correlation of the errors in the 
linear regression model, the study also employed the Paris-Winsten estimator (Paris & Winsten, 1954).  
Table 2. Summary of Variables Used in the Study. 
Variable Symbol Measurement  
Dependent Variables   
Return on Assets ROA Net income divided by total assets 
Cost-income Ratio  CIR Non-interest costs/Net income 
Independent Variables   
Board Size BDSIZE Count of the total number of members on the board. 
CEO Duality  DUALITY Dummy variable. 0 if the CEO is the same as chairman 
and 1 for separate leadership. 
Board Independence  BDIND The proportion of non-executive directors to the total 
number of directors. 
Audit Committee 
Independence  
AUDITIND The proportion of independent directors in the audit 
committee to the total number on the committee. 
Foreign ownership  FOROWN 1 if the firm is foreign-owned and 0 if it is Ghanaian 
owned.  
Control Variables    
Firm size FMSIZE Log of total assets  
Listing LISTING Dummy variable: coded 1 if a sample bank is listed and 0 
if otherwise. 
Big 4 auditing firms BIG-4 Dummy variable: code 1 if the firms are audited by the 
Big 4 auditing firms and 0 if otherwise.  
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4.3 Model Diagnosis  
Table 3 shows that no autocorrelation among the variables since Prob>f was 0.0007. Similarly, the 
data shows no Heteroskedasticity since prob>chi was 0.0000. This suggests that the empirical model is 
fit for the study.  
Table 3. Test for Model Fit. 
Model fit   
Autocorrelation Test 
  




Chi2 (1) 32.07 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 
5. Results and Discussion  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max. 
BDSIZE 8.450 3.719 0.456 1.025 6.000 12.000 
DUALITY 0.201 0.164 -0.432 -0.696 0.330 0.601 
AUDITIND 0.450 0.300 -1.491 0.248 0.200 0.510 
BDIND 0.420 0.466 0.574 -0.494 0.300 0.530 
FOROWN 0.380 0.486 0.511 -1.756 0.000 0.410 
ROA 0.017 0.037 -0.212 2.851 -0.220 0.074 
CIR 0.139 0.276 -0.492 3.741 -1.091 0.603 
FMSIZE 5.835 0.989 3.881 14.255 2.398 7.508 
LISTING 0.240 0.427 1.232 -0.489 0.000 1.000 
BIG-4 0.666 0.473 -0.281 -1.945 0.000 1.000 
 
The results from Table 4 indicate that the average board size of commercial banks in Ghana is 8, 
with a minimum number of 6 members and a maximum of 12 members. This is an indication that 
commercial banks have a moderate level of board size. On average the board is composed of 42% non-
executive directors. This indicates that the majority of the banks' boards are not independent. This is a 
weak sign since an independent board is required for good corporate governance.  
Furthermore, about 20% of firms on the average have the CEO occupying the chairmanship 
position. This depicts that banks have separate persons holding the roles of the CEO and chairman of 
the board. Audit committee independence recorded an average of 45%, indicating that banks relatively 
have an independent audit committee. The result shows that about 38% of the sample banks are 
foreign-owned.  
The average ROA and CIR were found to be 1.7% and 13.9% respectively. This is an indication 
that the banks generate low returns on their assets employed. However, the banks’ efficiency 
performance looks promising. Some banks have reported negative CIR and ROA, suggesting that 
much improvement is needed. The average for total assets and Big-4 were 5.835 and 66% respectively. 
This indicates that the Big-4 auditing firms in Ghana audit most of the banks. The result shows that 
24% of the sampled banks are listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange.   
5.2 Correlation Matrix 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the study. It also shows the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance statistics to test for multicollinearity between the 
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variables. The result indicates that the highest correlation is 0.7945, which is between ROA and CIR. 
Furthermore, the results in Table 5 shows that the VIF shows the highest value of 1.72 and the lowest 
value of 1.06. Notwithstanding, the Tolerance statistics also recorded the lowest value of 0.581. This is 
an indication that two or more explanatory variables are not linearly correlated. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that multicollinearity is not an issue in the empirical model.  
Table 5. Correlation Matrix. 
Variables  CIR ROA BDSIZE DUALITY AUDITIND BDIND FOROWN FMASIZE LISTING BIG-4 VIF   
CIR 1.000                       
ROA 0.795 1.000                     
BDSIZE -0.143 -0.135 1.000               1.13 0.912 
DUALITY 0.054 0.138 -0.421 1.000             1.33 0.824 
AUDITIND 0.212 0.081 -0.16 0.033 1.000           1.72 0.638 
BDIND 0.300 0.191 0.114 -0.295 0.538 1.000         1.57 0.581 
FOROWN -0.146 -0.312 -0.124 -0.256 0.082 0.263 1.000       1.59 0.881 
FMSIZE 0.412 0.413 0.242 -0.612 0.282 0.35 -0.164 1.000     1.06 0.989 
LISTING 0.333 0.143 -0.022 0.193 0.406 0.328 0.022 0.494 1.000   1.47 0.721 
BIG-4 -0.056 0.032 -0.105 0.183 0.030 0.030 0.322 -0.166 0.000 1.000 1.43 0.657 
5.3 Analysis of Regression Results 
This section analyzes the regression result for corporate governance, financial performance and 
efficiency of commercial banks in Ghana. The result is presented in Table 6 below: 
Table 6. Regression Result. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS Prais-Winsten Prais-Winsten 
 CIR ROA CIR ROA CIR ROA 
BDSIZE -0.033*** -0.002** -0.030*** -0.002** -0.034*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
DUALITY -0.081*** -0.002 -0.082*** -0.001 -0.186*** -0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.000) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) 
AUDITIND -0.983 -0.009 -0.139 -0.011 -0.041 -0.001 
 (0.075) (0.013) (0.062) (0.008) (0.139) (0.013) 
BDIND 0.372** 0.031 0.245** 0.037* 0.178 0.009 
 (0.183) (0.030) (0.167) (0.019) (0.170) (0.019) 
FOROWN -0.079*** -0.011 -0.147** -0.010 -0.156 -0.012 
 (0.034) (0.008) (0.055) (0.007) (0.102) (0.009) 
FMSIZE 0.073*** 0.020*** 0.066*** 0.019** 0.232*** 0.023*** 
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.032) (0.009) (0.013) (0.004) 
LISTING 0.088 -0.003 0.063 -0.001 0.054* -0.012*** 
 (0.054) (0.012) (0.057) (0.012) (0.030) (0.004) 
BIG-4 0.098 0.015 0.053 0.013** 0.143* 0.025*** 
 (0.051) (0.009) (0.067) (0.006) (0.044) (0.008) 
Constant -0.273 -0.087** -0.141 -0.079 -0.230** -0.093*** 
 (0.126) (0.039) (0.235) (0.057) (0.120) (0.025) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.354 0.304 0.341 0.305 0.320 0.253 
Wald 143.94*** 32.38***   458.94*** 562.20*** 
F-Stats   7.37*** 5.08***   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01), **Coefficient is 
significant at the 0.05 level (p<0.05), ***Coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level (p<0.1) 
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The result in Table 6 indicates that large board size has a significant negative effect on ROA and 
CIR at the 0.01 level of significance for all three regression estimates. This demonstrates that hypothesis 
1 is not supported. However, the significant negative result depicts that a percentage increase in board 
size leads to a decrease in the performance and efficiency of Ghanaian banks. When board size is too 
large, there arises the free-rider problem. Thus, most board members become passive in their roles of 
monitoring and will eventually hurt performance and efficiency, which could be a reason for the poor 
performance and collapse of some Ghanaian banks in 2017 and 2018. Again, this finding is in support 
of the agency theory, which suggests that a large board size will hinder the CEO and the organization’s 
performance. The study finds inefficient use of assets of most banks in the sample resulting in negative 
ROA, a large board size poses additional cost to the bank. According to the study of Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006), large board sizes are costly in terms of compensation and incentives, and it is ineffective 
in monitoring performance.  
This result is in line with the study of Frimpong et al. (2015) and Nyarko et al. (2017) who found 
a negative but insignificant association between large board size and the performance of banks in 
Ghana. The reason for the significant result in this study may be due to the methodology and the 
sample size employed. The study also provides differences and specificities in the sample, making the 
result significant contrary to previous studies in the banking sector of Ghana. However, the research 
is in agreement with the findings of Adusei (2011). The study found that the size of a bank’s board 
decreases as its profitability increases.  Therefore, the study result provides new evidence for banks 
to have a small board size.  
CEO duality recorded a significant negative effect on CIR at the 1% level of significance, but no 
significant impact was recorded between CEO duality and ROA in all the three regression estimates. 
This suggests that, while CEO duality may negatively affect the efficiency of Ghanaian banks, it has 
no significant effect on banks’ financial performance. Under the old governance regulations for banks 
by the Banks of Ghana (2017), the positions of Managing Director and Board Chair can be occupied by 
one person in the case of domestic banks. Still, they cannot be held concurrently in the case of foreign 
banks.  The result of this study could explain why the bank of Ghana cited operating inefficiency as 
one of the reasons for closing down most banks (Bank of Ghana, 2018). It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the new corporate governance code for financial institutions in Ghana encourages the separation 
of powers by separating the role of the board chair and the managing director/CEO (Bank of Ghana, 
2018). The result of the study is in line with this new regulation since CEO duality negatively and 
significantly affects the efficiency of Ghanaian banks. Meanwhile, Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) argued 
that CEO holding the chairmanship position would be dominant and take decisions that maximize his 
interest as against that of the shareholders, and this could explain the case in Ghanaian banks  
Another interesting finding is that audit committee independence has no significant effect on CIR 
and ROA. Therefore hypothesis 3 is not supported. Although the result is insignificant, the positive 
relationship indicates that the crucial role played by the audit committee in protecting the interest of 
shareholders and its effect on the efficiency and financial performance of the firm. The audit committee 
is to oversee the preparation of financial statements, alleviate the changes in earnings restatements, 
and improve the credibility in the financial statement. Therefore, this committee increases the 
confidence of investors and maximize shareholders wealth (Zhou et al., 2018). A similar study by 
Nyarko et al. (2017) found a significant positive relationship between audit committee independence 
and the financial performance of banks in Ghana. Frimpong et al. (2015), however, reported a negative 
relationship between audit size and performance of banks in Ghana. This study supports Zhou et al. 
(2018), who found no significant relationship between audit committee independence and firm 
performance. The research is inconsistent with other studies like Hamdan, et al. (2013) and 
Zábojníková (2016). 
The result revealed that board independence has a positive and significant effect on CIR and ROA 
at the 5% level of significance in the 2SLS and OLS regression. The Prais-Winsten regression shows 
that the effect of board independence on CIR and ROA is significant at the 1% significant level. This 
stipulates that having a majority non-executive board of directors affects the efficiency and 
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performance of banks in Ghana. The finding supports a prior study by Nyarko et al. (2017) on 
corporate governance and performance of Ghanaian banks. The result is also in line with Tornyeva 
and Wereko (2012) who posited that the majority of non-executive members on the board would 
enhance the independence of the board, this leads to an effective monitoring role by the board and 
encourage competition among managers which eventually leads to improvement in performance. 
Similarly, agency theory posits that firm performance is enhanced when there are more non-
executive directors. Amid recent shakeup in the banking industry, the role of independent directors 
needs to be reinforced since the descriptive statistic in Table 4 recorded an average of 42% and a 
minimum of 30% for board independence. This study is consistent with the works of Khan, Nemati, 
and Iftikhar (2011) and Kyereboah-Coleman (2007), who find a significant positive relationship 
between board compositions and firm performance. However, Kajola (2008) found a negative 
association between board composition and firm performance.  
Furthermore, the result of the study shows that foreign ownership hurts both CIR and ROA. 
However, the effect of foreign ownership on ROA was found to be significant at the 5% significant 
level in the 2SLS and OLS regression. In contrast, the effect of foreign ownership on CIR was 
insignificant in all the three regression estimates. This result is quite surprising since it is anticipated 
that banks with foreign ownership are highly monitored and governed. These banks invariable tend 
to employ cost reduction methods and better technology to reduce waste that may lead to improved 
efficiency and performance (Nyarko et al., 2017). Although this is an unexpected result, the study is 
consistent with that of Kyereboah-Coleman and Beikpe (2006b) who reported a negative effect of 
foreign-owned firms on performance. Nevertheless, this result is contradictory to the study of Nyarko 
et al. (2017), who found that foreign ownership of banks has a significant positive association with the 
performance of banks.  
6. Conclusion and Policy Implication  
This study provides further insight into corporate governance and the performance of banks in 
Ghana. The study reported mixed results for governance variables and performance measures. This 
demonstrates that the relationship between corporate governance, bank efficiency, and financial 
performance in the Ghanaian banking sector could be multifaceted.  Moreover, it could be an 
indication that the banking sector did not follow the government guidelines and regulations strictly in 
the initial years of the study sample which could explain the cause of the banking crisis in late 2017 
and early 2018. The main findings of the study indicate that small board size and board independence 
are crucial determinants of firm performance. While CEO duality may not affect the financial 
performance of banks, it is a significant determinant of bank efficiency. On the other hand, while 
foreign ownership does not affect the efficiency of banks, its effect on financial performance cannot be 
overemphasized. Last but not least, audit committee independence was not found to be a crucial 
determiner of performance in Ghanaian banks. 
The result of this study has several policy implications for both managers of banks and 
policymakers. Firstly, for improved efficiency, Ghanaian banks should separate the role of the board 
chair from that of the managing director/CEO. Secondly, banks in Ghana are encouraged to have 
independent boards composing more than 50% non-executive members and board size of at most eight 
members. Thus, banks should keep a moderate size of corporate boards to balance their performance. 
Although, the effect of audit independence on performance was not significant banks are encouraged 
to implement a strong independent audit since a positive effect was recorded. Finally, foreign banks 
are encouraged to increase monitoring and supervision to improve their efficiency and financial 
performance.  
The study has several limitations that need further consideration. This study only focused on 
board characteristics, ownership, and leadership variables. However, it must be stated that corporate 
governance embraces a wide range of variables like legal, political, and economic environment, 
ownership, structures, employee involvement in daily activities, the existence of internal controls, 
among others. Therefore, further studies are encouraged to look into several corporate governance 
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variables to ascertain the full picture of the effect of corporate governance on the performance of 
commercial banks in Ghana. Our data set dating from 2005 to 2015 constitute another limitation of this 
study. It is suggested that further studies widen the scope for the data set and could compare the effect 
of corporate governance on performance before and after the banking clean-up exercises. The 
conclusions and validity of this study, however, has not been compromised due to these limitations.  
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